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Chapter One: 
 Islam and the West: Old Rivals or Ambivalent Partners 
-“There had been no systematic campaign of forcible Islmization in Spain after the 
Muslim conquest. Yet within two centuries the Christians of Al-Andulas had for the most 
part adopted Islam. The vigorous methods pioneered by Jimenez de Cisneros (leading 
Inquisitioner in Granada) were dictated by political motives and they seemed o succeed 
in the short term. By law, and on paper, Islam was ended and whole nation made 
officially Christian”. Andrew Wheatcroft, Infidels: The Conflict between Christendom 
and Islam 638-2002, London, 2003, pp. 140-1. 
 
-“Britain and the US did everything to avoid a peaceful solution in Iraq and 
Afghanistan”, George Monbiot, “Dreamers and idiots”, The Guardian, 11 November  
2003. 
 
-“I’d rather be a Paki than a Turk”. (English football fans in Hastings, 2003) 
 
 Without subscribing to a clash of cultures or feeling apologetic about relationship 
between Muslims and the West, the unevenness in their mutual interface is certainly an 
ironic reality. Whether it is owing to an age-long theological contestation or more recent 
geo-political tensions the fact, however, remains that the powerful sections from amongst 
the Western politicians, media and academia—not just the ordinary masses—perceive 
Islam as the most unnerving threat. In a rather abrasive way, they find the entire fault 
lying with the Muslims. The events of 9/11, though largely condemned by Muslims but 
also not without protestations over the Western double standards in Western Asia and 
elsewhere, not only caused massive attacks on countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, they 
have equally intensified Muslim predicament in Palestine, Chechnya, India and several 
other places. The unprecedented rolling back of civil liberties, interment of 660 undefined 
Muslim internees on Guantanamo Bay, strict visa restrictions for Muslim applicants, 
profiling of millions of Muslim Americans, the daily reports of harassment of Muslims in 
Diaspora and a pronounced negative spotlight on Islam are some of the sad components 
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of this so-called war on terror. Of course, there are millions of people in the West and 
elsewhere who, through a rainbow peace movement or by demanding equal rights for 
everyone, have been vocally critical of such multi-faceted campaigns, but their 
demonstrations even in the world’s oldest and proudest democracies failed to restrain 
official jingoism. The cohabitation between an exclusive nationalism and evangelical 
Christianity, anchored upon permeating undercurrents of Orientalism, has never been so 
intense in the North Atlantic region. President Bush, Prime Ministers Tony Blair, 
Antonio Berlusconi, John Howard and Jose Maria Aznar were driven by a strong 
Christian unrighteousness and so have been Ariel Sharon, L. K. Advani and several other 
leaders across the globe, to whom undertaking campaign against Muslim activists has 
been more than a political expediency.1  
The popularisation of the Republican Party in the American South eventually 
leading to President Bush’s re-election and a vigorous Christian Right zealously trying to 
convert Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan through direct evangelical activities or by 
distributing aid and charity goods, are some of the features of this Neoconservatism. 
Frank Graham, the son of Billy Graham, led Operation Christmas Child aimed at sending 
shoes to the Iraqi children, attuning them for conversion. The outbursts by Berlusconi on 
the superiority of Christian civilisation over the rest especially Islam, and the 
unrestrained outbursts of the U.S. General William Boykin against Muslims with the 
reverberations of similar policy postures in France, Germany and Australia revealed a 
wider convergence among official and private prejudices. Islam, certainly, after 9/11 
emerged as the `new enemy’ with Muslim life and culture deserving no substantial 
respect rather being referred as the greatest and the oldest threat to superior Western 
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cultural norms and values. Undoubtedly, several Christian elements within the North 
Atlantic region felt unease over this opportunistic and uncalled for campaign at a time 
when Muslims across the world accounted for a huge underclass caught between 
indigenous suffocation and external derision. It was feared that the evangelical activities 
hidden behind the mask of charity both in the United States and Britain on the heels of 
massive destruction in Western Asia would only accentuate anti-Western resentment in 
the Muslim world.2 This is not to deny the fact that there are Muslim rejectionists as well, 
to whom, West symbolises only hostility and arrogance and the best way to deal with it is 
either through confrontation or sheer indifference. Though both Islam and the West are 
trans-territorial and allocating them an essential regional or cultural specificity is 
ahistorical, yet for the sake of convenience, one has to depend upon such denominators.      
 Other than the military onslaught, it is the academic and media vilification of 
Islam and the resultant Muslim peripheralisation that retain the most damaging and 
inimical portents. The translation of military and political campaigns or even of racist 
typologies into religious idioms is certainly spawning cultural conflicts, though often not 
unwittingly. 9/11, military campaigns and a pervasive Islamophobia have certainly 
resuscitated the harbingers of `clash of civilisations’ though in reality this is already a 
one-sided and rather vehemently ominous ploy. The ragtag Taliban, secular yet 
authoritarian Ba'athists or a few solitary vocal groups high on slogans yet unable to 
obtain a basic iota from rote knowledge from traditional madrassas are no comparison to 
the massive killing machines at the disposal of the Western regimes. The powerful 
monopolies over media, diplomacy, economy and presence of loyal intermediaries all 
across the Muslim regions make it further difficult for any Muslim factor to make its 
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presence felt across the board. Even a minor semblance of ideological or logistical unity 
amongst the disparate activist groups has not been possible though their disgust with the 
Western hegemony and duplicitous policies in the Muslim regions converges with the 
rising tide of Anti-Americanism and a serious critique of hitherto unblemished 
modernity. These turbaned and bearded activists, with all their emotive rhetoric, are 
certainly no match for the organised forces of some of the most powerful states in the 
world. On the contrary, their outbursts even to resist hegemonic presence have been only 
causing more bloodshed of the co-religionists. Characterised by its clear-cut class-based 
features, the war on terror, despite is altruist rhetoric, has transpired a further devastation 
of some of the poorest regions in the world and a denial of civil liberties to millions. It 
might be a clash of similar fundamentalisms with some clerics hijacking the Muslim 
ideology of Jihad and the Neoconservatives and Ultra-Right elements hoodwinking the 
Western voters. The Zionist+Christian alliance, like the Likudists, Russian nationalists 
and Hindutva ideologues, posits Islam as the main obstacle to overcome before the 
Second Coming of Christ, yet the fact remains that since 9/11 the world has become more 
dichotomous. While the dissolution of the Cold War could have augured a better, self-
respecting, peaceful and less polarised world—short of the end of history—it did not 
need to be led into still another catastrophe. The issues of environment and poverty or 
epidemics such as the AIDS have been sidelined by unilateral militarisation amidst the 
strictest immigration controls and the serious rollback of civil rights even in the most 
vocal democracies. The intolerance of one type has been spawning several others of 
immense proportions on all sides. The Western governments, to evade their own poor 
performances in social sectors, find in Al-Qaeda a useful alibi whereas the racist elements 
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seek their pound of flesh by scapegoating mostly non-White and predominantly Muslim 
communities amongst them. The war on terror, soaked in its Judaic-Christian syllogisms 
and by assuming the garb of a moral crusade against illiberals, terrorists, savages and 
non-democratic forces of evil arrayed against higher Western moral virtues, reflects a 
reinvigorated Orientalist discourse. The moralist postulation uttered by Bush, Blair or 
Berlusconi are not to be simply brushed aside as mere political asides or slips of tongue 
as they have represented the tip of an iceberg by virtue of being rooted in the legacy of an 
extended and often acrimonious past. Such a discourse takes us back to the core of a 
Europeanised modernity, which assumed the responsibility of redesigning a colonised 
world in its own dream. 
 While modernity offered enlightening prompts such as secularism, democracy, 
human rights and greater respect for diversity, it equally resulted into physical and 
cultural controls of the vast sections of human population in consonance with a continued 
denigration of their heritage. Racism, slavery, economic restructuring to suit the `core’ 
countries and a persistent legacy of hegemonic polices towards the impoverished regions 
are all part of the project of modernity that bequeathed scores of wars, Holocaust and 
ethnic cleansing. The scientific revolution added to human life span but also turned 
human groups into most violent and annihilative species on earth causing millions of 
deaths in the name of empire, nationalism, and patriotism and now, the war on terror. 
Naturally, such a significant project had to be deified with some `koshering’ that came 
though moral righteousness, the erstwhile White Man’s burden and is presently being 
justified through terms such as democratisation, restructuring and development. In a 
sense, it appears that even after centuries of efforts aimed at transforming the Western 
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Hemisphere, the Pacific Rim, Africa and Asia, if these masses have not yet absorbed the 
West European and the American constructs of development and advancement then there 
must be something irreparably wrong with them. Modernity is a mixed blessing for all 
and many of these tensions and dissensions are rooted in its transgressions. The West has 
been using European modernity to suit its needs and whims and Muslims like several 
others in the former colonies wrestle with it in their own ways. It is both seductive and 
destructive as all kinds of groups, including the fundamentalists of the various shades, 
harness it for their own specific needs.3 Our main hypothesis in this section is to show 
that the present-day misimages of Muslims and stereotypical if not totally derisive views 
of Islam have been rooted in more recent times where colonisation, slave trade, slavery, 
racism and Orientalism ran the roost. It is not the lack of knowledge among the Western 
elite that has unleashed a multi-dimensional assault on Islam; it is instead the restatement 
of hegemony and power politics and the lack of willingness to allocate a due space to 
Islam that continue to underwrite such attitudes and inanities. These slanted views, in 
fact, emerged long time back in history with the priests, popes, politicians and poets all 
sharing an exaggerated and concurrently undervalued view of Islam as a multiple threat 
while constantly refusing to accept it as a fellow Abrahamic tradition. Scepticism of the 
Prophethood and of the authenticity of the Quran and viewing Muslim politics as an 
eternal Jihad purported to eliminate Christianity and Judaism have been ever-present. 
Given the unique and often contested nature of mutual contacts and encounters such 
discretionary discourse engendered partisan attitudes and biased policies towards 
Muslims. Periodically and more often, such misimages and suspicions have been 
rekindled to substantiate partisan policies both in the past and especially since the end of 
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the Cold War, Islamophobia has become a pervasive cliché. The political prerogatives 
and even personal refrains, like at present, have always been couched in religious 
connotations and that is why powerful groups in the North Atlantic region and elsewhere 
tend to see in Islam the greatest-ever threat to their cultural norms and political stability. 
Accordingly, not only the humanity at large but Muslims as well have to be emancipated 
from an insidious threat so as to reincarnate a peaceful world shorn of Islamic threat. 
Renaissance and Reformation have to be endowed to the Muslims so to create proto-
Western communities instead of hooded, chest beating, bearded, sabre rattling and 
untiring hordes of Muslim fanatics. Islam, fanaticism, terror, irrationality and violence all 
have become interchangeable partake of Muslim history and religion. 9/11 has 
dramatically reignited this zeal, bringing politicians, evangelists, hate mongers and Neo-
Orientalists together to legitimise ongoing campaign. Whereas Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein or even Muslim monarchs or military dictators do not represent and 
reflect a diverse and humane civilisation like Islam, the agony of the Muslim populace 
certainly gets aggravated both by this authoritarianism combined with an enduring 
injudicious foreign intervention. Such an ideology of self-professed Judaic-Christian 
superiority over others, as symbolised by the present North Atlantic and several other 
proto-Western states, received manifold resuscitation under the political hegemony dating 
from a recent past though the origins of this unevenness date back from the early era of 
Crusades and the Inquisition. The resurgence of this derisive and multi-fanged ideology 
since 9/11 is not incidental and, in a way, has seriously replenished the existent damaging 
views of Islam and Muslims.4 It is important to revisit some of those opinion makers and 
transmitters whose analyses of Islam and Muslims, in most cases, have provided the 
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historical background to the specific views on Islam. They also offer a unique overview 
of Western/European legacies in Islamic studies, though it will be incorrect to say that the 
entire Western scholarship on Islam has been antagonistic. Other than laudable 
exceptions, outpourings from many of these immensely powerful individuals fully 
influenced people in powerful positions unleashing a plethora of policies reverberating in 
the new century making it more violent and humanly costly than the previous ones. 
 Before one could deal with a few representative specialists on Islam and their 
more recent views, it may be useful to seek an overview of European intellectuals and 
religious encounter with Islam as an important backdrop for contemporary discourses. 
However, it is imperative to state at this stage that the Western opinions about Islam are 
largely divided into the two main categories of protagonists and antagonists. Both these 
groups, over the centuries, have manifested a wide variety of professional multi-
disciplinarity and are not confined to mere ecclesiastic sections or politicians, as artistes, 
travellers, academics, courtiers, converts, spies, poets, novelists, journalists, filmmakers, 
aid workers, travellers, businessmen, NGOs and even ordinary people have reflected this 
ideological duality, which in more recent years, especially following the Salman Rushdie 
affair and the First Gulf War of 1991 has grown sharper. The Bosnian crisis in the mid-
1990s allowed some sensitivity to a better understanding of Muslims—not as perpetrators 
rather as victims—yet the 9/11 has unleashed a new energy for the proponents of clash of 
civilisations and the erstwhile efforts such as the Runneymede Trust’s Islamophobia, 
seem to have been already overtaken by a pervasive anti-Islam animus. Invasions, war 
mongering, brutalisation of Muslim population groups, especially in the politically 
contentious areas such as Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Kosovo, Gujarat and elsewhere 
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all have been taking place in a wider anti-Muslim malaise. The incarcerations of 
thousands of Muslims in Diaspora on minor suspicions, bans on charities and, the worst 
of all, an undefined agony of 660 internees in the Delta Camp on Guantanamo Bay are 
some of the sordid realties of this new war on terror. In the same vein, Israel, India and 
Russia and several other states, by applying a wider clamp down on their dissenting 
population groups have established their own special detention centres.  Israel has its own 
secret `Guantanomo Bay’ in the form of Facility 1391 and has been persistently violating 
Palestinian human rights over the last six decades. Ariel Sharon’s disregards for 
Palestinian life and property as perpetrated through an intense campaign of dispossession, 
wide-spread killings, destruction of the infra structure and the erection of a 20-foot high 
wall further partitioning and ghettoising Palestinian communities have gone on 
unhindered by any moral, legal or international restraints. To the shock of many Israelis, 
not only some of their pilots and solders, driven by guilt, have refused to kill Palestinians 
by turning `refuseniks’, their own country has been globally viewed as the greatest threat 
to the world peace. In a survey across the European Union in the late 2003, 59% 
Europeans viewed Israel as the serious most threat to the world peace, even greater than 
Iran and North Korea. Such opinions coming from an otherwise supportive Europe 
gravely shocked Israeli leadership and their supporters elsewhere who tried to portray it 
as the age-old anti-Semitism.5 
 The Western opinion, divided into the above-listed two respective broad groups 
of critics and supporters, is anchored upon a set of complex, historical, religious, political 
and intellectual reasons. The antagonists—mainstream opinion group for our purpose 
here--have always found faults with Islam by seeing in it an eternal foe whereas the 
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supporters perceive it to be a part of human heritage instead of an enemy. To the diehard 
antagonists, Islam, especially after the dissolution of the Cold war, is a significant and 
multi-dimensional threat to the Western societies and interests. To such elements—
assuming a higher moral and powerful pedestal-- Islam represents a Janus-faced 
fundamentalism and terrorism and has to be contained through stringent military-centred 
policies. However, some of them believe that the Muslim world needs some external 
putsch towards democracy and liberty and the West holds a historical and moral 
responsibility to bestow these virtues on the otherwise `backward’ Muslims.6  This group 
differs widely over the strategies to refashion the Muslim world with one section 
suggesting military means and has included Paul Wolfowitz, Daniel Pipes, Ann Coulter, 
Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and such other proponents of the New American Century, 
who sought religio-political justification for their “moral crusade”. Inclusive of Jewish 
and Christian elements with a sprinkling of some immensely ambitious Muslim-
Americans such as Fareed Zakaria or Zalmay Khalilzad and the camp followers from 
amongst the political exiles, this group has been led by Dick Cheney, the Republican U.S. 
Vice-President. The evangelical rationalisation for this group was provided by Franklin 
Graham, Pat Robertson and the other leaders of Jewish-Christian Right, who, in league 
with the Likud Zionists, desire a new Middle East under the aegis of American military 
and economic power. Sceptical of the United Nations or even the European Union, they 
are least concerned about the Muslim factor or the underlying conflicts within the 
contested domain of modernity, and are irritated by the lack of wider Muslim reciprocity 
for their project. They are at the most patronising if not outright dismissive altruists, 
though intentionally insensitive towards the Muslim sensibilities and, any indigenous 
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dissent, to them, is merely linked with the Al-Qaeda, or some Muslim irrational penchant 
for Jihad. To such a powerful group, the Bush Administration has been a blessing from 
blue to implement their plans where Israel, pro-Western and dictatorial Muslim regimes, 
and most of all, the Pentagon are the instruments for implementing a new order in West 
Asia.7 It will be not out of place to suggest that many of these people may harbour 
colonial and racist views without a forthright admission, and are puzzled by the research 
such as by the Pew Center on the global public opinions towards the United States. To 
them, Washington under a diehard Republican Administration, militarily unassailable and 
fully reflective of the ideas of the Neoconservatives can afford to be irreverent to global 
criticism including the `old Europe’. To them, America is inherently a moral force 
created for a wider good, but only in their unique way, as Democrats, Liberals and 
Islamists are not only irresponsible they are the main hurdles to the American enterprise. 
It is interesting to note that, despite being abhorrent of a predominant European critique 
of American policies, they reflect a long-held Christian legacy of European views and 
scholarship on Islam. Despite the support from certain conservative European sections for 
the U.S.-led campaigns in the Muslim world including “the lite empire”, American views 
of Islam and the Muslims, to a significant extent, reveal a continued tradition of 
Orientalism and derision, though the emphasis and style may be uniquely American.8 
Westernism and Christianity: Crusaders against a Common Foe 
 Though it will be simplistic to suggest that the Muslim-Western relationship is all 
about religion where Islam and Christianity (and now Judaism and others) have always 
interacted as perennial enemies. Simultaneously, it is also ahistorical to remove religion 
as a core factor in the often-acrimonious relationship, nor will it be helpful to suggest that 
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the relations between Muslims and the Christians have been characterised by eternal 
conflict, though they tend to receive more focus. In the same vein, a careful observer 
cannot afford to overlook the tribal, imperial, national and international rivalries that 
spawned conflicts as well as occasional unison on all sides. Moreover, instead of seeking 
a single-factor explanation, the relationship has to be seen within the context of centricity 
of power and multiplicity of factors such as language, class, culture and colour. Muslims, 
over the recent centuries, present a huge underclass of predominantly non-White clusters 
where hegemonies such as colonialism and Orientalism have only added to their 
stigmatisation though their predicament has been largely due to the underlying forces of 
politico-economic variety. Poverty and disempowerment, combined with internal 
authoritarianism and external hegemonies, have exacerbated pervasive Muslim plight and 
also the anger. Muslims of various orientations and nationalities find themselves in a 
typical `catch-22’ situation and the ameliorative efforts have to come from various 
directions. 
 Whereas politico-economic malaise may have occurred due to several forces and 
accompanying causes, the ideological trajectories accompanying the colonial hegemonies 
frequently used religious upper ground both to legitimise and to underwrite such control 
and conquest. The various decisive epochs in their past until 9/11 and the posthumous 
have always coincided with a flurry of writings, sketches and policies where Islam, the 
Prophethood, Muslim cultures and histories have mostly received negative spotlight. One 
may say that all the religions and ideologies of the world may have had their due share of 
derision but certainly “Islam was both misunderstood and attacked most intensely”.9 It is 
neither a coincidence not age-old conspiracy that the periodic tensions always tend to be 
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contemporaneous with derisory outpourings. Bordering on sheer hostility and racism, 
such typologies and caricatures have often reverberated with partisan, patronising and 
occasionally violent postulations. Western politicians, priests and scholars have 
frequently collaborated in positing Muslims as enemies, barbarians, anti-Christ, 
uncultured mobs and sheer terrorists. They have never shied away in using age-old 
lexicons dating from the Crusades, Inquisition, Expulsions and colonialism to relegate 
Muslim heritage into some perennial time warp. Undoubtedly, the recent evolution of the 
peace movement and greater trans-disciplinary sensitivity for Muslim predicament is 
nascent though quite a significant development otherwise, the Christian West, as per 
tradition, has been intolerant if not totally annihilative towards Muslims. Certainly, 
Muslims have their share of injustice and demonisation directed against non-Muslims 
though their counterparts frequently give out as if Muslims may have the lion’s share in 
violating and brutalising human rights. Historically, such a discretionary view does not 
hold the ground when one looks at the diversity and massive scale of violence committed 
against non-Whites and non-Christians, usually under the pretext of Christianisation and 
modernisation. The Crusades and the accompanying massive violence, Inquisition and 
the total extermination of Muslims and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily, ethnic 
cleansing in the Balkans since the Turco-Greek tensions all the way until the recent times 
and the millions of deaths and internment of Muslims from Mauritania to the Philippines 
during the colonial phase inclusive of centuries of pogroms in Russia are the cases of 
holistic and large-scale violence. Added with the slave trade, slavery, elimination of 
Natives across the three continents, the Holocaust and the intermittent imperial and 
global wars the total tally of human losses may well exceed several hundreds of millions 
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owing to Europeanization and Westernisation of the world. Thus, in a powerful way, 
violence against Muslims, Jews and other non-Western communities in the last few 
centuries—with the West (inclusive of Russia) at the prime of its power-- does not make 
a pleasant reading in human history. It is curious to note that the traditional Muslim 
communities in the Western heartlands totally disappeared whereas, on the contrary, non-
Muslim minorities and majorities not only survived, in some case, such as Jews, 
Bulgarians, Greeks and Hindu Brahmins, duly benefited from the Muslim sultanates and 
caliphates. Europe, during its internationalisation, not only turned intolerant to ethno-
religious minorities amidst its own populace, its modernising project radically 
depopulated several other continents. Such dramatic demographic changes can be 
countenanced only if scapegoating the Natives, indigenous and other such non-Western 
communities including Muslims receives a more critical and balanced perspective. For 
instance, the growth in violence in the Balkans since the nineteenth century is a rather 
complex and modernist phenomenon and was sadly perpetrated by all sides though the 
Ottomans were always apportioned the major blame. The focus on Turks fitted in with 
the preceding traditional misimage of Muslims—“the terrible Turks”—and thus Turkey 
got all the blame, while the Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs and others were presented either as 
victims or fellow Christians fighting against the barbarian Other. Likewise, the 
characterisation of the Middle East or Central Asia as eternally conflict-prone Muslim 
regions is rooted in the recent external interventions dating from the colonial era. There is 
no doubt that Kosovo, Palestine, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Moroland, 
Lebanon, Chechnya and Sinkiang making most of the contemporary news on violence are 
predominately Muslim regions, but violence therein largely has owed to foreign invasions 
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and not due to some specific Muslim penchant for terror. Muslims have used Islamic 
symbols of community building to resist foreign encroachments and have been quite 
vocal about it. Of course, some groups, as expected in such situations, undertook extreme 
measures but they still cannot override the root cause of these ongoing conflicts.  
To a great extent, the emergence of the Western Neoconservatives using religion, 
culture and history from the powerful political pulpits in Washington, London and Tel 
Aviv is rooted in the preceding centuries when Islam was viewed as the major-most 
enemy. The interplay of religio-political hostility towards Muslims, contemporaneous 
with the various crucial political developments, began soon after the death of the Prophet 
in 630AD. In 638, when an austere Caliph Omar reached Jerusalem to guarantee a 
peaceful co-existence to this plural city under the Muslim rule, Sophronius, the Orthodox 
Patriarch of the city, observed in Greek: “Surely this is the abomination of desolation 
spoken of by Daniel the Prophet standing at the holy place”. 10 Muslims were not merely 
a religious threat they were also considered a political menace and resistance to them had 
to be justified through scriptural rationale.  Soon, St. John of Damascus  (675-749), 
despite his erstwhile appointment at the caliph’s court until 716, came out with a scathing 
attack on Islam by declaring the Prophet Muhammad as Antichrist. This characterisation 
led to subsequent unfair treatment of the Messenger in the host of secular and sacred 
writings varying from the Venerable Bede to Dante and others. In fact, Bede had 
popularised the myth of Islam as Hagarism by seeking the birth of Ishmael—the son of 
Abraham—from Hagar, who in the Christian view, was not a wife rather a concubine. St. 
John’s followers, especially the priests in Constantinople and Rome, feared a Muslim 
conquest of these Christian-Byzantine citadels and kept up with a persistent attack on 
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Islam and, like St. John, considered Muslims as infidels. It was the Muslim conquest of 
Spain, Portugal and Sicily and forays into Central Europe and France that further 
infuriated the various Christian elite. The papal call for Crusades coincided with the vital 
political changes in an increasingly fragmenting Europe, though northern Spain helped by 
the Christian knights and volunteers undertook a leading role in counterpoising a multi-
dimensional campaign against Muslims. As articulated by Montgomery Watt, the 
Christian Europe at that time suffered from a serious inferiority complex and Islam as the 
major-most religious and political threat engendered a keen sense of unity and 
escapism.11 The Muslim conquest of Spain12 is well documented with an ever-increasing 
focus on a successive pluralism and splendid aspects of the Islamo-Spanish culture, but 
the conquest of the Southern Italy and similar cultural and social synthesis largely 
remains unexplored. Muslims had been attacking Sicily since 652 AD—long before their 
incursions into Spain-- but were only able to make major inroads in the early ninth 
century when they captured Palermo in 831. Led by Aghlabids of North Africa (Tunisia), 
the Muslims conquered Naples in 837, Messina in 843 and Syracuse in 878. After 
capturing Bari on the North Adriatic, they threatened Rome in the 840s. Pope John III 
(872-82) paid tribute to Muslims for two years to ward off any direct conquest.  
Following the Aghlabid expulsion from Tunisia by the Fatimids in 909, Southern Italy 
became a Fatimid province. But the eastward shift of the Fatimid interest with a major 
focus on Egypt since 948 weakened their hold on Italy though the province being ruled 
by the Kalbite family offered good governance. It was during their rule that the Islamic 
culture established its roots in Sicily and, like Muslim Spain, a successful pluralism and 
an active commerce flourished. But Muslim rulers soon lost their control to the invading 
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Normans who captured Messina in 1060 and took charge of the entire southern peninsula 
by 1091. Unlike the Catholic Spain, Normans did not expel Muslims and co-opted them 
fully in their set-up. Norman Kings like Roger II (1130-54) and his grandson, Frederick II 
(1215-50), despite contemporary tensions, protected their prosperous Muslim subjects 
and came to be known as “the two baptised sultans of Sicily”.13   The conquest of Sicily 
by the Normans initially tolerated Muslim presence by co-opting them in agriculture, 
industry and other urban professions. The Arabo-Norman culture, as reflected in arts, 
architecture, language and cuisine, showed the possibility of a plural co-existence but 
papal bulls were soon to mount an annihilative campaign against these early Italian 
Muslims. A Spanish Muslim, Ibn Jubair, visiting Sicily in 1184—a century following the 
Norman conquest—could still witness plural culture and felt exuberant not only in 
Palermo but also in the countryside. He named Palermo as al-Madinah al-Kabir, the 
great city, resplendent with diverse cultural activities. “It has Muslim citizens who 
possess mosques, and their own markets, in the many suburbs. The rest of the Muslims 
live in the farms of the island and in all its villages and towns.” He further noted that 
William II, the Norman King, was “admirable for his just conduct, and the use he makes 
of the industry of the Muslims” and goes about “in a manner that resembles the Muslim 
Kings”.14 But owing to xenophobic calls, this pluralism was soon to end with the re-
Christianisation of Southern Italy and elimination of Muslim community from the island, 
not so far from the papal Rome, itself spearheading the Crusades. Soon, the mosques and 
other religious buildings were turned into churches and cathedrals and forcible 
conversions became the order of the day. This drama was again to be enacted in Portugal 
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and Spain and eventually Southern Italy would become the launching pad for a decisive 
naval encounter with the Turks in 1571 at Lepanto. 
 The Crusades destroyed pluralism not only in Italy and other Mediterranean 
island but also played havoc with the Christian, Jewish and several Muslim groups across 
the Levant and the Holy Land. Concurrently, they implanted two powerful enduring 
legacies for Muslim-Christian relations. Firstly, they solidified a distorted image of Islam 
in the West, which continues to reverberate even today from political polemics to serious 
studies. Secondly, it became an emotive obsession for West Europeans—collectively 
called Franks by their Muslim contemporaries—and their lack of knowledge of the 
objective realties in the Levant. 15Transporting so many armies for such a long period of 
time for demolition purposes became an enduring Western tradition, which has been 
repeated quite often ever since. The resistance by the locals was as much undervalued as 
it is today with the Anglo-American troops in West Asia and Israelis trying to dispossess 
an entire local population from Palestine. After the Fall of Granada in 1492, the massive 
scale of ethnic cleansing in Castilian Spain went on for a century and by the early 
seventeenth century Muslims, Moors or Moriscos had totally disappeared from their 
native land.16 The descendants of Ferdinand and Isabella such as Charles V and Philip 1 
and II ensured the elimination of Muslim presence from Spain, lent substantial help 
against the Ottomans, captured territories in North Africa, exiled many remaining 
Muslims to the new colonies and played a major role in the Mediterranean warfare until 
the Armada was destroyed in 1588. Seventeen years earlier, the Castilian/Hapsburg 
princes had led the naval war against the Turks and defeated the hated Muslim enemies 
near Greece. Sicily was the headquarters for the Battle of Lepanto while the leadership 
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was provided by Spain and Christian volunteers filtering in from all over Europe. The 
Pope led the prayers and efforts to defeat the hated infidels and sent his closest bishops to 
Messina to bless the departing warriors. The Spanish colonists, showing similar level of 
contempt and zeal, tried to subjugate Muslims in Southern Philippines. They were even 
named as Moros by the Spanish colonials who tried to convert them to Christianity. 
History was to repeat in the Balkans during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries though 
not before the extermination of the Natives across the Western Hemisphere where 
Christianity and colonisation joined hands besides initiating the “peculiar” institution on 
an unprecedented scale. But like in Sicily, Spain eliminated Muslims physically yet could 
not obliterate their cultural and architectural heritage which remains so powerful through 
its Moorish and Mudejar representations across the converted mosques and numerous 
other edifices. 
In the aura of the Crusades and Christian conquests in the Mediterranean regions, 
European Muslims were declared outsiders, barbarians, brutish and the deadliest enemy 
whose religion, culture and heritage were to be decimated. The Crusades encouraged the 
Spanish and Italian Christian elite to mount military campaign against these `infidels’, 
and the creation of the myth of St. James and of the Holy Pilgrimage in Galicia (Santiago 
of Compostela) duly helped the Crusading fervour amongst the Asturian kings.17  While 
Muslims—called Moors for understandable reasons of differentiation and denigration—
had mostly guaranteed respect for pluralism, the conquering Christian monarchs pursued 
dual-edged policy of conversion and expulsions. The end of Granada in 1492 and the 
subsequent elimination of Muslims from Andalusia was the final phase in Reconquista. 
The Muslim conquests in the early era in the Near East, Sicily, Iberia and Eastern Europe 
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have been presented for centuries as an unmitigated desire by the adherents of Islam to 
subjugate Christians. Instead of looking at the historical events within their political and 
related multi-dimensional causation, they were always posited as the rise of Crescent 
over the Cross. Of course, like the West European conquests since the rise of the Catholic 
kings, Columbus and Napoleon were also perceived by many Muslims as a transcendent 
Cross annihilating a weakened Crescent. However, European writers and ecclesiasts, 
following the critique of St. John of Damascus and the priests in Spain and Rome, never 
allowed Islam its own space by simply denigrating it as a mere heresy. Medieval 
European misimages of Islam focused on denying prophethood to Muhammad, who, for 
instance in Scotland, was called as Mahound.  The Ottoman retreat from Vienna in 1683 
and the subsequent wars in the Balkans vehemently regimented the Christian-Muslim 
divide.  By this time, Western Europe had already established its hegemony over the vast 
tracts across the Muslim world and the previous misperceptions and misimages were 
reincarnated through the willing generations of Orientalists. 
Western Discourse(s) on Islam:  
The study of relationship between Muslims and the Europeans and post-
Columbian North Americans is a fascinating subject of mutualities as well as of 
acrimonies. Long before the traditions of Colonialism, Orientalism and Neo-racism--
inclsuive of massive slave trade and slavery—manifested ambiguity, rivalry, hostility and 
curiosity on all sides. This encounter was characterised by images and misimages and 
permeated through religious, political, intellectual, military and economic channels. Even 
in the 21st century the same five channels seem to be carrying the historical burden 
though media, Diaspora and greater trans-regional factors have added to complexity of 
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this encounter. The continuing images and misperception of Islam and Muslims, despite 
the hyped up globalisation and greater inter-cultural encounters, have refused to go away 
and instead, in several cases, have been reinforced. How were these images established 
and who instrumented them even in a pre-Orientalist phase, is itself a fascinating area. 
While Europe (West per se!) and non-Muslim Orient (East and Southeast Asia) lacked 
proximity with Europe until recent times, it is the predominantly Christian Europe and an 
overwhelmingly Muslim West Asia and North Africa which have mainly experienced 
such bilateralism. Jews and Christian in the Muslim heartland and Muslims in the 
Christian heartland proved to be trans-cultural agents long before the media and other 
technology-based channels set in. While to some observers, the lack of massive channels 
may be the root cause of mutual discords, to others, the very multiplicity and longevity of 
the mutual encounter itself might have spawned disharmony. The following section, 
before an assessment of the views of some of the representatives of the above-mentioned 
groups in contemporary era, seeks to summarise the historical background to this often 
acrimonious and occasionally cherished relationship. 
 More than anywhere else, Islam “was a problem for Christian Europe”.18 To the 
followers of Saints John and Peter, it was the new religio-political enemy, which had 
replaced Christianity from its heartland besides claiming religious and cultural space. The 
successive and often victorious Muslim caliphates, especially those controlling the 
Mediterranean, despite their protection of pluralism, were perceived as significant socio-
political and even civilisational threats, whose expansion and institutionalisation was 
concurrently envied and contested. Islam evoked both envy and enmity and until the 
eighteenth century it was the most significant roadblock to the Europeanization of the 
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Afro-Asian world though the commercial, cultural and economic relations between the 
two thrived even during the turbulent Crusades, when a new Europe began redefining 
itself.19 The earliest views of Islam revealed a fear of this “new” religion, which, to many 
early Christian observers was either a heresy or a mere derivate of Judaism and 
Christianity. Both the belittling as well as the exaggeration of Islam underwrote this 
ambivalence that bordered on hostility, owing more to the early opinions of Christian 
writers such as St. John of Damascus. The personality of the Prophet Muhammad, his 
claim of divine revelations as accumulated in the Quran and the Muslim views of Jesus 
Christ and other biblical prophets as prophets of Islam were the focal points of this early 
Christian ire. Islam was often called Mohammedanism despite the Prophet’s exhortations 
on being a messenger of God and not the founder of any personality-centred theology. 
However, Muhammad's marriages, his role as a commander of the faithful, his critique of 
early Judaic and Christian scriptures for having been tampered with by the priests and 
Islam’s expansion across the regions all intensified this anger. Islam, rather than waiting 
for a polity to adopt it, had created its own state following the Prophet’s migration to 
Medinah and then expansion of this highly politicised religion to the lands of urban 
civilisations of Sassanid Persia and Byzantine Rome were unnerving especially given its 
roots from the backwaters of the Arabian desert. The Crusades were as much an effort to 
wrest the control of the erstwhile Christian heartland, as they were the efforts by 
Christians to gain supremacy over fellow Christian lords and nobility. The papal desire to 
seek a de jure authority over princes and aristocracy posited a common target whereas the 
motives and strategies ran parallel to the stated goal of conquering the Holy Land. The 
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wrath against fellow Christians, Jews and Muslims knew no bounds for almost two 
hundred years until Saladin decisively terminated the European onslaught in 1091. 
 The Medieval Europe benefited as well envied Muslim Spain until its western 
regions, in the wake of political, religious and commercial redefinition, embarked on the 
road to modernity. It was during the medieval age that one finds the first Quranic 
translation into Latin by Robertus Ketenesis in 1143 though the contemporary European 
knowledge of Arabic outside Muslim Spain was quite limited. The same translation was 
formally printed in Basel four centuries later owing to Martin Luther’s personal interest 
and in 1616, a German rendition was accomplished by Salomon Schweigger. A Dutch 
version followed soon afterwards. Islam’s Middle Eastern origins, similarities as well as 
differences with the other two main Abrahamic traditions, and, most significantly, its 
political role as a conquering ideology germinated interest in understanding its classical 
heritage like the Quran. The redefinition of Christian Europe on sectarian, national and 
absolutist lines happened within the backdrop of Renaissance and Reformation. The 
Europeanization of the world—a development of immense historical and cultural 
significance-- had begun at a time when Jews and Muslims were being expelled from the 
Iberian Peninsula; new routes were being discovered to the East and the West and the 
three Turkish/Timirud dynasties had established themselves in the Near East, Persia and 
the Indian Sub-continent, respectively.20 Soon, the emerging West European intellectuals, 
writing in Latin and emerging `vernacular’ languages found Islam to be both exotic as 
well as the `other’, which was to be feared and envied for its vitality, simplicity and 
devotional appeal. The rise of the Ottoman dynasty increased European religious and 
intellectual interest in Islam and Arabic though mostly reflecting hatred instead of any 
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objective or serious scholarship. Like the contemporary arts, the emerging `national’ 
literatures in Europe reflected embodied ambivalent and curious if not totally hostile 
views on Muslims, who by now, had graduated from being referred to as Arabs or 
Barbarys into Turks. Dante’s relegation of the Prophet in the Inferno remained the 
pervasive view in contemporary Europe and the converts to Islam—commonly known as 
renegades—were always unacceptable like the marauding North African pirates, whose 
escapades resulted into loss of ships and human kidnaps for ransom. The `new’ encounter 
with the Sub-Saharan Africans and their subsequent enslavement was fully justified 
through moral and religious scriptures adding to ambivalent if not totally indifferent 
attitudes towards Muslims. This was the beginning of the European politics of 
enslavement and encroachment though the Ottoman Caliph was still considered a 
possible ally at least by the Tudor monarch, Queen Elizabeth 1, against the rival 
European powers such as Spain and France. The distant Mughals and Safwids were also 
viewed as potential allies whose riches and cultural vitality amazed the explorers, 
travellers, traders and special ambassadors. Even the Turkish coffee became controversial 
as it might spread the word of `Saracens’ among the gullible elements.21 However, some 
minor ecclesiastic interest in Islam as a rival phenomenon remained present among the 
specific sections of West European societies, especially in France and Britain. William 
Shakespeare and Christopher Marlowe often dilated on Islam-related themes in their 
plays and poems, seeking both exotica and an historical parallel based on a perceived 
otherness.22 It was in 1587 at College de France in Paris that the regular Arabic classes 
began, soon to be followed by similar efforts in Holland and England. The chair at 
Leiden was established in 1613, to be followed one at Cambridge in 1632. Two years 
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later, Oxford created a similar chair with Edward Pococke (1604-1691) as the pioneer 
scholar. He had spent some time in Syria as a chaplain to the English merchants and had 
translated some of the works of Imam Ghazali, a Medieval Islamic theologian. However, 
it was George Sale (1697-1736) who offered the first proper, full-length translation into 
English of the Quran, though erstwhile several individuals in the preceding decades had 
undertaken some fragmentary efforts. Sale’s translation was from the Latin text, 
originally rendered by Lodovico Marracci. Sale duly recognised the Prophet 
Muhammad’s apostolic credentials and infinite wisdom. History of Saracens, the first-
ever work on Muslim-Arabs in English, was authored by Simon Ockley (1678-1720), 
which like Sale’s prefatory remarks accredited Muhammad with distinct capabilities. 
Another contemporary, Robert Boyle (1627-1691), a founder of the Royal Society, 
developed a lasting though not so positive interest in Islam and Judaism, mainly 
purported to authenticate Christianity.    
 The post-Columbian curiosity in the `Orient’, typified both by powerful Timirud 
empires and the emergence of new West European overseas empire, coincided with the 
commercial expansion of a divided but deeply energised Western Europe. The joint stock 
companies, under the tutelage of the private directors or owned by the crowns initiated 
European globalism that reverberated in the contemporary literary works highlighting 
exotica as well as extravaganza. The European emissaries visiting Agra, Fez, Isfahan and 
Constantinople came back not only with enormous presents but also with the stories of 
self-sufficient and even prosperous Muslim empires over the vast lands and diverse 
peoples. Unlike the coastal Africa, the Eurasian and Mediterranean Muslim regions were 
centre of political power and cultural development and Western relationship had to be 
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based on mutual respect and strictly for political-economic motives. It is only in the 
subsequent centuries that these very factors eventually led to the creation of fully-fledged 
empires but not until the central authorities had begun to stalemate. Eighteenth century 
turned out to be a threshold of Muslim decline and the concurrent rise of the European 
maritime empires. A vibrant, unchallenged and expansive Western Europe led to the 
depopulation of several continents and the establishment of colonial hegemony, often 
erected with the participation of the indigenous elite, occasionally called intermediaries 
or the predecessors of present-day surrogates. While the trading companies from France, 
the Netherlands and England had already begun establishing `factories’ and trading posts 
in the Muslim coastal towns their Iberian predecessors exhibited greater zeal in 
physically transporting and converting indigenous populations to Catholicism. This 
newly energised and highly ambitious Western Europe pursued colonisation and slave 
trade without any remorse or challenge. Consequently, millions of Africans were 
transported to the Western Hemisphere, of whom a sizeable portion were African 
Muslims, generally known as Moors. Within a generation or two these Africans became 
proto Americans taking on the religion and culture of their masters though nonchalantly 
and the early Islamic factor in the Western Hemisphere submerged until to be 
rediscovered in the Twentieth century.23  
The Inquisitional Christianity fell hard on Muslims, Jews, Africans and the Native 
communities in the Western Hemisphere or even in the Far East. However, it was 
Napoleon, fresh from his exploits during the French Revolution, who undertook a 
massive campaign to encounter and conquer the Muslim heartland. In 1798, he landed in 
Egypt in the company of soldiers and more than 200 scholars to formally build up closer 
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amity with the Muslims. Earlier, he had been in correspondence with Tipu Sultan of 
Mysore, who had been fighting the British in India. Tipu Sultan had, in fact, invited 
Napoleon to attack India, and had employed some French military commanders to train 
his Muslim and Hindu troops to fight the British East India Company. In a crucial battle 
at Seringapatam in 1799, Tipu was killed and his prized belongings were taken to Britain 
with the credit of victory going to Wellesley Brothers in India.24 Napoleon, on his arrival 
in North Africa, tried to soothe the Egyptian fears by proclaiming that the French 
“worship God far more than the Mamluks do, and respect the Prophet and the glorious 
Qur’an…the French are true Muslims”.25 During this period of Enlightenment amidst a 
widely subscribed idea of progress, Europe had assumed the flagship role to civilise the 
world in its own image. The secularising impact of modernity reflected in contemporary 
writings on Islam where admiration as well as dismissal characterised writings by known 
authors like Voltaire. Edward Gibbon devoted a chapter of his monumental work to 
Prophet Muhammad and the ascension of Islam. His verdict, after an initial applause for 
the prophetic career in Makkah, soon turned into a critique of the polity that the Prophet 
had created in Medinah. Gibbon had problem in relating with the Prophet as a politician. 
However, some exceptional intellectuals of this Enlightenment era such as Henri de 
Boulainvilliers (1658-1722) saw Muhammad preaching a rational religion. Herman 
Reimarus (1694-1768) felt that people were unduly criticising “the Turkish religion” 
without having “read the Alcoran…”.26 Even George Sale, after having published his 
English translation of the Quran in 1734, was not apologetic. David Frederick Megerliu 
followed Sale in 1772 by publishing a German translation of the Quran directly from the 
original Arabic text. Johann Jacob Reiske (1715-1774) can be accredited for pioneering 
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German works on Muslim history. However, Goethe is often referred to as one of the 
most prominent names in this generation of Enlightenment intellectuals, especially in 
Germany, to have recognised Muslim contributions towards the classical heritage. He 
adopted several Arabo-Persian words dating from the era of the Crusades. In the world of 
literature, it was Joseph von Hammer-Pugstall (1774-1856), who translated several 
leading Arabic, Persian and Turkish classics into German and introduced his readers to 
great Muslims writers of the early Medieval era such as Hafiz, the Persian poet of Shiraz. 
He also completed a monumental 10-volume History of the Ottoman Empire. His student, 
Friedrich Ruchert (1788-1866), carried on the German tradition of Oriental scholarship. 
But, as observed earlier, European Enlightenment traditions, followed by the 
Romanticists, more often showed a kind of “literary hatred” towards Turks in particular 
and Muslims in general.27 After the establishment of Fort William College in Calcutta by 
the British East Company in the 1770s, one sees a greater curiosity for `Orient’ owing to 
direct dialogue between West European and South Asian literary traditions. However, by 
that time it had already become almost a unilateral discourse reflective of European 
globalism and the outpourings by widely quoted authors such as Gustav Weil, William 
Muir, Aloys Sprenger and D. E. Margoliouth tended to draw visibly negative portraits of 
Islam and the Prophet. Concurrently, the missionaries had also been well established in 
the Muslim regions such as in South Asia and pursued their evangelical activities 
displaying an unassailable vigour. However, from amongst certain traditional Muslim 
elite—ulama—several took upon themselves to engage these Western missionaries into 
debate on the Prophethood, similarities and differences between Islam and Christianity 
and how Islam was a revealed message despite all the sceptical views held by the latter. 
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Karl Pfander, a German enthusiast form the Church Missionary Society, soon engaged in 
a debate at Agra with a Muslim scholar, Shaikh Rahmatullah al-Kairanawi, though 
withdrew only after the second session.28  
 India had by then emerged the focal point of this Islam-Christianity encounter and 
several British officials such as William Muir (1819-1905) extended the domain and 
works of early Orientalists like Sir William Jones (1746-1794), who had devoted most of 
his attention to philological issues.29 Muir, who had been a participant at the Agra debate, 
returned to Scotland to head Edinburgh University and published his Life of Muhammad, 
which received wider attention in the British literary circles. The book presented a mixed 
portrait of the Prophet and showed Islam merely as a branch of Christianity. Thomas 
Carlyle, the famous Victorian essayist, saw in Muhammad a not-too-unfamiliar hero and 
accepted him as a fully-fledged prophet. Another of his contemporary, Charles Forster—
the grandfather of the novelist E. M. Foster—in his volume, Mahometanism Unveiled, 
offered rather unbecoming opinions on the Prophet of Islam. It is interesting to note that 
his own grandson considered his works rather totally pedestrian. Charles Forster’s views 
on Islam were typical of his generation, which was imbued with a self-professed sense of 
racial superiority and exhibited a moral uprighteousness while interacting with the non-
Christian non-Whites. The early encounter with such people as in India based on equality 
and curiosity had given way to sheer regimented imperialist attitudes underwritten by 
neo-racism. This was the high water mark of Orientalism when missionaries, writers, 
intellectuals, colonial administrators, artists, women visitors or even home-based scholars 
produced tomes of writings and sketches, creating non-European societies in their own 
images. There was a massive outburst of writings, paintings and commentaries of both 
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secular and sacred nature, which, in the wake of `reorganisation’ and `redefinition’ of the 
colonised societies and the imports of the curious and exotic, left permeating imprints on 
contemporary consciousness. The museums, imperial exhibitions, military parades, 
civilian shows, biographical literature and official gazetteers on the colonised societies 
added to a masculanised view of nationalist-imperialist discourse in West Europe. The 
colonised were shown to be in a state of cultural and intellectual inferiority and needing 
modernist European initiatives inclusive of colonial edifices to put them on the road to 
self-discovery and better living. Social Darwinism was not only the legitimising 
principles of the powerful class of entrepreneurs at places like the United States it was the 
main ideology underwriting Victorian norms and mores. It is curious to note that the 
stereotypes and derogatory images of non-Christian Asians, Africans and other Natives 
were not merely confined to people in the `home’ countries, most of the colonial 
administrators themselves were fully imbued with them. They operated as the redeemers 
out on a civilising mission and posed as the mai bap (li: parents) for the indigenous 
peoples. In several cases, the former had popularised such misimages in the first place 
portraying a strong religious (Christian) component. Accordingly, while Hindus and 
Buddhists may have been perceived as too ascetic and less challenging, the Muslims were 
always viewed as formidable opponents whose acculturation required urgent initiatives. 
Here, Islam was not seen as an identity marker rather a bane of problems for its believers, 
as it commanded a complete subordination and utmost sacrifice. Muslim resistance to the 
colonial rule, often justified in the name of religion and Jihad, was used to substitute a 
widely subscribed Muslim otherworldliness, which had to be harnessed by sheer force. It 
is fascinating to see how the Crusade-based misperceptions were revived during the 
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height of European colonialism, though in the latter case they were more varied and 
supported by complex economic and military factors with intellectual justification also 
fully in attendance. The French, while confronted with the revolt in Algeria led by the 
Salafis, felt that their secularism in a Christian garb could wrestle with the Islamist forces 
and thus citizenry was discreetly allowed to only those North African Muslims who were 
willing to renounce Islam. Such Western policies were the components of a multifaceted 
project of imperialism, which refused to be contented only with the political or economic 
matters. The Dutch avoided the extreme civilising measures though in British India, a 
hierarchal view of Indian societies—the latter being essentially communal and 
premodern—received full publicity and the efforts were fully devoted towards 
Westernisation. W. W. Hunter, an Indian civil servant (ICS) and latterly an academic in 
Oxford, saw Muslims “eagerly drinking in the poisoned teaching of the Apostles of 
Insurrections”. Alfred Lyall, Syed Ameer Ali and Syed Ahmed Khan contested Hunter’s 
view the way the Muslim founder of the Aligarh movement challenged William Muir on 
his views of the Prophet.30 Other than his detailed biography of the Prophet of Islam, 
Muir, quite unabashedly believed that “the sword of Muhammad and the Quran are 
[were] the most stubborn enemies of civilisation, liberty and truth which the world had 
ever known”. William Monier-Williams, another head of the Oxford-based Indian 
Institute, viewed Islam as “an illegitimate child of Judaism”. The Revd Malcolm MacColl 
found Islam unacceptable because of its tolerance for polygamy though some colonial 
administrators of this Victorian era including Alfred Lyall, Theodore Beck and William 
Becker duly recognised Islam’s tolerance towards non-Muslims.31 But the Orientalists, in 
most cases, dominated the contemporary discourse and known authors such as Jane 
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Austen, Rider Haggard, Joseph Conrad, Richard Burton, Lord Byron and their 
contemporary literati vocally upheld specific, uneven and strong views on non-Western 
peoples. Their generation was to be followed by another generation reflective of the 
Victorian imperial idioms and included writers such as Rudyard Kipling, E. M. Forster, 
Katherine Mayo and Albert Camus. By that time, it was not merely South Asia or North 
Africa, which were the focal points of this modernist intellectual altruism; a steady 
growth of writings on the Ottomans also revived the age-old scare of “the terrible Turks”. 
The Greek war of independence had invoked the British romanticists like Lord Byron, 
and the Eastern Question elicited unrestrained support for Christian communities in the 
Balkans whereas the massacres of Muslims and their expulsions were glossed over both 
by the West European politicians and intellectuals.32 Only the massacres of the 
Christians—Bulgarians, Armenians, Greek Orthodox and others—received prominent 
coverage in the diplomatic and press reports and the near elimination of Islam from 
Eastern Europe remained almost underreported.33 Likewise, the Russian expansionism in 
the wake of intermittent pogroms of the Muslims in the Caucuses and Central Asia went 
on unchecked. By the 1860s, Ming rulers in China had already captured the vast Turkic 
lands in Central Asia following some of the worst ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the 
kingdom itself. 
 As researched by Rana Kabbani, benefiting from the Saidian paradigm, 
Orientalists such as Goland, Chardin, Chateaubriand and Lady Montagu along with the 
romanticists of the nineteenth century including Shelley, Keats, Byron, Coleridge, Moore 
and others fully exoticised the East. Their romanticist outpourings on non-Western 
societies such as Muslims further objectified the colonised peoples. They were 
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considered infantile, childlike or even childish, exotic, vulnerable, well meaning but 
equally dubious, lost in the torpor of primitive traditions with the Anglo-Saxons and 
Gaels heralding their deliverance. The East, to such writers, was essentially the land of 
The Arabian Nights where women, in particular, were not only tormented but equally 
prone to spellbinding manoeuvres. Metaphorically, empire, to the French, British and 
even Dutch writers, was an alluring woman, whose nearness was guaranteed through 
sheer control and subordination. The contrasting images of the imperialised women 
varied from vulnerable victims to scheming witches.34 Travellers and fortune seekers like 
Richard Burton, Charles Doughty and subsequently T. E. Lawrence and Louis Massignon 
found this East mysterious, alluring and complex and needing Western patronage and 
guidance to modernise itself. Westernisation was the major component of this multi-
facted scheme of modernity, though some writers such as Wilfred S. Blunt tried to offer 
an opposite but strictly a minority view of respect for these traditional societies. It is not 
surprising that Bernard Lewis, Wilfred Thesiger, Elias Canetti, Linda Blandford, Emma 
Duncan, Richard Reeves, Christina Lamb, Daniel Pipes, Ann Coulter, Richard Perle, 
Oriana Fallaci, V. S. Naipaul, Thomas Friedman, Charles Krauthammer and an ever-
growing circle of experts on Islam are the latter-day purveyors of the same imperial 
tradition, though in some cases, more sophisticated but essentially paternal, detached yet 
self-righteous.35 The contemporary Orientalist discourse is not merely confined to 
professional writers, it also includes a vocal section of roving journalists, travellers and 
some individual writers sharing nostalgia for the gone days of empire. A growing number 
of expatriates or Diaspora writers such as Salman Rushdie, who feel uncomfortable with 
being called Commonwealth writers, also reflect a growing yet complex genre emanating 
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from within the Orientalist tradition. Certainly, a critical discourse as articulated by 
intellectuals including Frantz Fanon, Leopold Senghor, Aime Cesaire, Albert Hourani, 
Edward Said, Eqbal Ahmad, Gyatri Spivak, Immanuel Wallerstein, Stuart Hall, Ziauddin 
Sardar, in league with the liberal and critical groups within the former `core’ countries, 
has also made its mark in the contemporary debate. 
 Despite the lack of any colonial connection between the German states and the 
Muslim world, several German scholars, over the past several centuries, showed some 
religious and philosophical interest in Islam and often compared it with Christianity and 
Judaism. For instance, to J. G. Herder (1744-1803), Islam was basically a primacy of the 
Arab spirit, a view that reverberates in the works of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). The 
philological research by William Jones, the pioneering Indianist, deeply benefited 
German Orientalists including Franz Bopp (1791-1876) and Wilhelm von Humboldt 
(1767-1837), and reflected in the works by F. Max Muller (1823-1900). Like 
Anthropology--a major ingredient of Colonial+Orientalist reconstruction of the non-
Western societies--the development of philology as a significant academic pursuit 
remains the hallmark of the Victorian era. In France, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), while 
deeply immersed in neo-racism, played a crucial role in fashioning European views of 
Islam. His writings covered a wider terrain and led towards the categorisation of human 
societies on the basis of their languages. According to his hierarchical dictum, human 
societies consisted of three groups: firstly those who, to him, lacked collective memory 
and thus lacked a defined culture. Over and above them will be the second category of 
civilised races such as the Chinese and others who had obtained a certain level of 
civilisation but were incapable of going beyond that status. The third and the most 
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competent category mainly consisted of the two great peoples of the Semitic and Aryan 
races. The Semites had pioneered religions such as Judaism and Islam whereas the 
Aryans excelled in sciences, philosophy, arts and literature. Compared to the Semites, 
Aryans were multi-disciplinary and forward-looking who carried the burden of 
refashioning the entire humanity by demolishing both the Semites and other counterparts. 
In pursuance of the true traditions of neo-racism, Aryans epitomised human perfection, 
and the rest, as laid out by Ernest Renan, were mere appendages. Such Continental views 
reverberated across the width and breadth in the West where Gypsies, Jews, Catholics, 
Muslims and other Afro-Asian peoples were defined as inferior races. Within the heart of 
Europe, Jews became the `enemy within’ and Catholics were perceived as emotional, 
half-cultured and essentially superstitious people, vulnerable to authoritarianism. Even 
Weberian explanation of capitalism vocally hinged on the Protestant ethics just like 
present-day hierarchical views where Muslims are presumably locked in some pre-
Reformation and pre-Enlightenment time warp. But Renan’s views did not go 
unchallenged by the contemporary Muslim modernists, Jamal-ud-Din al-Afghani (1839-
97), who engaged the former in some discussion in Paris on the subject. Afghani brought 
out his magazine, Urwathul Wusqa and sought a reinterpretation of Islam without feeling 
apologetic towards its classical traditions. Living in a colonial Paris after travelling across 
the Muslim lands including the Ottoman Empire, Afghani influenced a generation of 
Indian and Arab modernist Muslims. His espousal of Pan-Islamism, away from the 
political overlordship of any particular dynasty, also won him a major following among 
Muslim intellectuals, especially in British India and Egypt. The other major intellectual to 
challenge Renan’s views was a Hungarian Jews who was to emerge as the leading scholar 
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of Islam in modern era and whose treatises were to establish an independent and more 
judicious tradition of Western scholarship on Islam. Ignaz Goldzihr (1850-1921) refuted 
Renan’s views on Judaism and then immersed himself in Islamic studies by focusing on 
the Prophetic traditions. His first-hand initiation into Islamic literature and Arabic by 
virtue of living in the Middle East led to his recognition of Islam both as a fully-fledged 
religion and a distinct culture. In Cairo, he met Muslim scholars including Afghani and 
became the first-ever Western scholar to study Islam from its primary sources by 
immersing himself in the contemporary centres of Muslim learning such as Al-Azhar.36 
He applied critical methods in his study of Islam, especially the Prophetic traditions and 
resisted the temptations of working for any university or such other establishment. He 
was vocally uncomfortable with some Jewish and Christian groups displaying patronising 
attitudes and thus preferred to stay independent of any peer pressure. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when Oxford was more occupied 
with the Indic studies under the tutelage of Indologists like William Monier-Williams and 
Max Muller, the discipline of Islamic studies remained peripheral allowing a lead to 
Cambridge with W. Wright (1830-1889) being appointed to the Arabic chair. He had, in 
fact, studied at Leiden and was soon joined by several other distinguished colleagues 
such as R. A. Nicholson (1868-1945), W. Robertson Smith (1846-1894) and E. G. 
Browne (1862-1926). Subsequently, Oxford, exhibited some interest as well by 
appointing D. S. Margoliouth (1858-1940) to undertake teaching and research on Islam, 
followed by his successor, H. A. R. Gibb (1895-1971).37 In London, owing to its 
increased interaction with the vital Middle Eastern regions especially after the First 
World War, and due to a growing need for area specialists for all types of reasons, the 
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School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) had been founded.  Still, most of the 
teachers and researchers at the British universities lacked first-hand exposure to Muslim 
societies and regions. Other than administrator-scholars attached with the Royal Asiatic 
Society and the Asiatic Society of Bengal, a few individuals left their imprint on the 
contemporary views of Islam. E. W. Lane (1801-1876) had lived in Cairo for a number of 
years and other than his Manners and Customs of Egyptians, produced a distinguished 
Arabic-English dictionary.38 However, the most influential traveller-writers of the 
Muslim Middle East during the twentieth century were: T. E. Lawrence (1882-1935) and 
Louis Massignon (1883-1962), who spent years in the region; learnt Arabic, interacted 
with the colonial administrators and tried to assume vanguard roles for their individual 
countries in building up links with the Muslim Arabs. They both were the last of the 
`romantics’—though one may also include several more like Wilfred Thesiger, Eric 
Newby and William Dalrymple, whose works have also shown fascination and often-
complex relationship with their non-Western associates. 
 Louis Massignon, with a strong Christian background in France and education in 
metropolitan Paris, travelled across North Africa and stayed for a while in Cairo and Iraq. 
At one stage in Basra, he was arrested and during the tense moments of internment 
underwent some spiritual transformation, though as admitted by him, his prayer was in 
Arabic.39 Massignon’s postgraduate research had been on the great Muslim Sufi, al-
Hallaj (d.922), who had been hanged by the Abbasids in Baghdad for his radical ideas. 
Subsequently, Massignon sympathised with the anti-colonialists in Madagascar and 
Algeria fighting the French colonial rule. However, he remained deeply rooted in his 
personal Catholic traditions yet greatly respected Islam for its unequivocal views on 
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monotheism. He was greatly influenced by the Islamic mysticism and hoped for a greater 
Christian-Muslim interface. As is seen by subsequent research on his work, Massignon 
remains a permeating influence on the French scholarship on Islamic mysticism, and is 
accepted as a mentor in this field. Like Massignon, T. E. Lawrence also combined the 
roles of an empire builder, a scholar and a romantic figure whose own life, later 
disillusionment with the regime and rather an early death in 1935 have led to an indelible 
impact on the British attitudes towards the Middle East, Arab nationalism and 
Orientalism.40 He had met his contemporary, Massignon, during his youth and led the 
Arab revolt in the Hejaz against the Ottomans. He certainly had a complex relationship 
with the Arab rebels led by Sharif Hussein and must have felt deeply betrayed not only 
by the mandatory system but also with the British turn-about on their former allies. 
Lawrence’s book Seven Pillars of Wisdom reveals not only his personal immersion into 
the Arabo-Islamic world but also his effort to be seriously taken as a specialist on Islam. 
David Lean’s film, Lawrence of Arabia, has further popularised his romantic mystique 
and dashing personality but, like Robert Byron, Baden Powell and Alfred Thesiger, he 
remained a puzzling figure until his early death in a traffic accident in 1935. At times, 
Arabia and Lawrence seemed to be intertwined with all their myths and heroism. Both 
Massignon and Lawrence, like other fellow colonists, were stupendously complicated 
personalities representing the contemporary contradictions inherent within the colonising 
societies. Lawrence, for instance, suffered from acute paranoid of self-denial and self-
flagellation, which turned acute after the British betrayal of his Arab associates like 
Sharif and Feisal.41     
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 As can be seen from above brief resume, a non-Western world and the 
former colonies including the entire width and breadth of the Islamic world, have been 
focus of a diversity of scholars, missionaries and colonial administrators, all imbued with 
curiosity for their own reasons but still believing in some inherent inferiority of these 
cultures. Christianity, despite its origins in the `East’, was appropriated as a European 
heritage whereas Islam was characterised as an Asiatic religion while Judaism was seen 
located somewhere in-between depending upon the variable contemporary attitudes 
towards Jews. The rising trajectories of exclusivist nationalism and racism in the near 
past underwrote an overpowering ideology of imperialism especially in Western Europe, 
which was subsequently adopted in the United States. By the late-nineteenth century, 
Holland, owing to its colonial enterprise in Southeast Asia, had also begun some 
scholarly efforts on Islam, mainly at the Leiden University. Interestingly, Britain, France, 
Germany and Holland all remained interested in researching Islam yet it did not elicit any 
major following from amongst the students.42 H. A. R. Gibb, expecting a more receptive 
American scholarship for his works on Islam, moved to the United States after teaching 
at SOAS and Oxford. Gibb’s influences were felt among many of his students and 
contemporaries including Marshal Hodgson and Clifford Geertz. Hodgson (d. 1968), 
known for inventing terms such as `Islamicate’, `Irano-Semitic, `Timurids’ (for 
Mughals), or `Jama’i’ (for Sunnis), sought the explanation of human civilisations 
including Islam in reference to three factors: ecology, group interests and creative 
individuals. Influenced by Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, he focused on 
`Oikumene’--the Afro-Eurasian region in its centrality to the evolution of cultures--and 
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produced his well-known The Venture of Islam. Geertz is known for pioneering 
anthropological studies on Muslim regions.    
  During the post-Second World War decades, a new generation of specialists in 
Britain such as Kenneth Craig, W. Montgomery Watt and Norman Daniel undertook 
diverse studies on Islam. Contemporary United States, due to its pronounced global role 
in the Cold War and owing to geo-political interests in the Muslim world, also began a 
significant phase of historiography on Islam. The emergence of a Muslim Diaspora and 
the evolution of groups such as the Nation of Islam have further added to this interest on 
Islam though geo-political considerations, specific lobbies and a common lack of 
comparative analysis have characterised usually American views of Muslims. Numerous 
American scholars have been dealing with the various academic realms of Islamic 
studies, yet it is in the areas of geo-politics and journalism that most of the energies have 
been concentrated. The national interests as well as dramatic portrayals of Muslim 
societies both have allowed these two areas to steal a march over more serious academic 
disciplines. While the Western politicians have been making all the vital policy decisions, 
it is the media coverage that, to a large extent, still betrays images of Muslims varying 
from sworn enemies to `different’ clusters. Like their former colonial counterparts in 
Europe, the American, Australian and Canadian perceptions of the Muslim peoples are 
deeply impacted by specific discretionary views and are underpinned by a pervasive 
civilizing sentiment. The traditional support for Israel, especially due to a Holocaust-
related guilt, has made it further difficult for them to assume a fully balanced view of 
Muslim sensitivities. 
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 Scholars of Islam in the United States have come from diverse backgrounds 
reflecting various preferences and have included known names such as Bernard Lewis, 
John Esposito, Daniel Pipes, Carl Ernest and several Diasporic Muslims such as the late 
Professors Ismael Faruki, Aziz Ahmad and Fazlur Rahman at Temple, Toronto and 
Chicago, respectively. American Muslim academics include men and women as well as 
some local converts, besides a growing number of Muslim women academes.43  They are 
joined by an astounding number of media specialists, though often reflective of cursory 
and Orientalist views, whereas some novelists have taken on Muslim themes and 
certainly Hollywood has its due share as well. In the United Kingdom, it is only in the 
past two decades that a growing interest in the Middle Eastern studies has begun to 
increase though Islamic studies as a discipline remains divided into several regions. Often 
these disciplinary and regional divisions create wider gaps. For instance, teaching and 
research on South Asia, accounting for the world’s largest concentration of Muslim 
population, remain mainly focused on Indic studies with Islam either non-existent or just 
an incidental part of it. Somehow, the Western scholarship still keeps on treating the Arab 
regions as the core areas of Islam, whereas Central, Southern and Southeast Asian 
Muslim communities and likewise the Sub-Shoran areas remain largely peripheral. There 
are some exceptions to this reductionist view yet Islam continues to be perceived as an 
Arabian particularism.44 The lack of immersion in Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Bengali, 
Malay and Urdu also hinders academics from promoting studies on Muslim communities 
and in addition, absence of familiarity with Islam as a religion also presents a major 
impediment for many of these academics who are either Westerners, Russians or even 
Indians holding important chairs of international history with a very few Muslim 
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academics holding key academic positions.45 Places such as Durham University are 
already experiencing an institutional decline in Middle Eastern studies though a growing 
number of younger Muslims along with a few British Muslims like Martin Lings and Gai 
Eaton—mostly on their personal basis and in the footsteps of Muhammad Asad-- have 
been pursuing their studies on Islam. The Muslim media--both print and visual—along 
with some emerging think tanks are the new post-Rushdie developments. However, 
researches by British academics such as Ernest Gellner and Fred Halliday are widely 
quoted whereas some British academics such as Michael Gilsenan and Roger Owen have 
already moved to the United States.  In France a growing professionalisation is gradually 
allowing Muslim scholars to make their presence felt and academics like Muhammad 
Arkoun have made their due impact. Maxime Rodinson, Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, 
who, other than the first, are mostly interested in the contemporary issues of political 
Islam, follow noted names such as Louis Massignon. However, a steadily growing 
number of European Muslim scholars seems to be gradually building up a tradition of 
progressive Islam though it is still early to estimate their influence on the long-held 
Western views of Islam. Despite a major Turkish presence, studies on Islam in Germany 
are either being pioneered by the German scholars or by a few Sufi converts. In a 
nutshell, Islam still remains a peripheral discipline in academia and for politicians and 
journalists, it is the contemporary politics, which remains alluring. Holland, especially 
Leiden, carries on with its age-old tradition of scholarly works on Islam including the 
Enclypoedia of Islam and other periodical literature. The periodic seminars and special 
publications, as reported in the ISIM Newsletter offer a growing Europe-wide curiosity if 
not fully-fledged disciplinary interest in the Muslim peoples, arts, history and politics. 
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The EU has been sponsoring such research institutes and diverse think tanks across 
Europe to provide sufficient expertise on Muslim polities though the effort remains 
divided into regional studies. However, one has to be careful before overestimating a 
scholarly interest in Islam in the West, especially after 9/11 when official and private 
misimage of Muslims have become quite familiar many Muslims, including from 
academia, feel further marginalised. Following the terrorist attack and official retaliatory 
policies, the research centres and especially Muslim think tanks in the West have 
assumed a diminished profile, which is not helpful for a no-holds-barred debate. 
Apologia, introversion, along with some cases of aggressive reaction, reflect subterranean 
tensions within the Muslim communities. The profiling of Muslim individuals, 
internment and expulsion of thousands of Muslims across the regions, ban on headgear 
like in France and Germany, routine negative media portrayals, partisan focus on Islamic 
fundamentalism and harassment of several second-generation young men on mere 
suspicion have relegated Muslim minorities to an immensely low status.46 Certainly, the 
efforts for a better, plural and multi-cultural world have been nefariously pushed back by 
decades.  
 As is obvious, the political and economic interests in the West, often justified 
through moral and cultural excuses, have usually vetoed other cultural or social 
prerogatives. While European domination of the rest of the world introduced 
Christianity—both by intent and as an accompanying reality—the intellectual and literary 
interface with non-Western societies such as Muslims has reflected a self-righteous 
imperial baggage. Modernity came in with its mixed imprint in the wake of 
Europeanisation of the world and that is where slavery, racism, Orientalism and uneven 
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inter-regional and inter-communal realties took precedence. Even though the slave trade 
and subsequently the institution of slavery were banned in the early nineteenth century 
and in the United States in 1863, the hierarchical realties of an uneven world still remain 
evident, more than half a century after the decolonisation itself. No wonder, Western 
moral postulations and exhortations for the developing world evoke mixed feelings and 
more often engender mistrust. Though it will be half-true to suggest that only the 
Crusades, Christian Conquest of Muslim Spain followed by Inquisition and ethnic 
cleansing, or the recent colonisation have been responsible for this unevenness in 
perceptions and relationship, yet it is nevertheless important to remember that even today, 
geo-political and economic objectives, often at the behest of specific interest groups, 
neutralise individual efforts for a positive and reconstructive human discourse. The 
hegemonic policies of the colonial era anchored on racist typologies and derision 
continue to persist, often characterised by a direct intervention or through obliging 
intermediaries. The interest in natural resources and other geo-political assets across the 
Muslim regions, combined with security concerns for regional allies such as Israel in the 
post-colonial era, have only intensified a massive public disillusionment both with the 
local regimes and their Western backers. Amidst a rising tide of Islamophobia, the 
marginalisation of Muslim organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) has angered radical Muslim elements desirous of creating Islamic utopias by 
expelling their ruling elite and their Western backers. Humiliation, anger, grudge and 
betrayal collectively have spawned anti-American sentiments among some Muslim 
radicals including Al-Qaeda who decided to take on the United States as a symbol of 
Western power and invincibility. Never before the acts of a few cost so much of anguish 
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to so many. Muslim inability to forestall the destruction of Muslim populace in several 
regions and a multiplied anger over the continued Anglo-American unilateralism, amidst 
a multi-prong campaign—often defined as new Crusades by several Muslim opinion 
makers—regimented the premise of clash of civilisations on all sides. Once again, it 
became obvious that the anomalous political relationship between the Muslims and North 
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